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BOOK REVIEWS
at frequent intervals. This method, together with the typographical makeup,
prevents the work from having the outward appearance of an orthodox law-
book.
The most interesting parts are the chapter dealing with the "rate base," or
the various elements of value upon which proper income may be predicated, and
the chapter entitled "Smith v. Ames is Fraught with Grief." The last-named
chapter deals with the famous case, in I898, in which the Supreme Court of
the United States laid down the "fair value" rule. Unfortunately, no one,
least of all the judiciary, can or tries to give a definition of "fair value" to fit
all cases. The rule is intended to be a fluctuating norm, accommodating itself
to each new case and not attempting to force the latter into arbitrary and
previously established limits. The author shows how this rule has led to
results as absurd and chaotic as the thoughts of Thersites. He advocates
instead the "prudent investment" rule of Justice Brandeis (dissenting) in
the Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. case, 262 U.S. 276, etc.,
although he admits that the "fair value" rule is too firmly established to be
dislodged.
Having praised the book, and it contains much that is praiseworthy, it were
idle to pretend that it has no faults. One of these is the fact the simple and
direct literary style of the author sometimes prevents sufficient thoroughness. Oc-
casional dullness is not too much to pay for detailed exactness.
Another quasi-fault is the repetition of the same quotations to illustrate dif-
ferent rules and the repetition of the same rule in different disguises. Probably
this was unavoidable. At the same time, it does create an impression that
material is being squeezed out with filmlike thinness. This impression is not
destroyed by the long appendices which, with an excellent index, carry the
book to a total of 381 pages, plus 21 preliminary pages. Considering the size
of the book, its price appears excessive.
DANIEL J. MCKENNA
Some Lessons from Our Legal History. By William Searle
Holdsworth, D.C.L., K.C., Hon. L.L.D. Published by the Macmillan
Company, 1928.
The purpose of the author in writing this book is to have the student and the
practitioner of law read legal history as a foundation and background of his
legal education.
The treatise touches only superficially an exceedingly interesting subject, and
gives one an insight into what legal history holds in store; for example, the
origin of the Roman and common law, the formation and development of the
jury system, and the origin and subsequent development of the old common law
writs.
Legal history enlightens us as to how the law developed in its several phases,
and also as to the introduction of the common law into the United States.
During the period following the Revolution the common law had difficulty in
gaining a foothold; there was much opposition to it and much favoritism for
the Napoleonic code which was at that time in its infancy. Legal history
explains and fixes these facts in one's mind.
Legal history gives the background of the earlier method of deciding cases,
as contrasted with the present tendency of following the decision in previously
decided cases.
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May the writer suggest that Some Lessons from Our Legal History would
be an excellent basis for a course of study to be substituted, in the curriculum
of the pre-legal student for some of the present courses?
MATTHEw F. SCHIMENZ, JR.
